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Ixc. v.
A. No. 2;)254.

XEVADA DEsERT INK

In Bnnk.

I :Ei C.2d

Nov. 4, 1955.]

'l'HB GAGNON COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation) et al.,
Appellants. v. NEVADA DESERT INN, INC. (a Corporation) et aL, Defendants; STANLEY BUHKE, Respondent.
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.
-A stockholder's representative suit is a "derivative action"
since th<" wrong to be redressed is one against the corporation,
which normally would bring suit, and it is justified by the
stockholder's ultimate interest in the corporation.
[2] !d.-Stockholders - Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-Generally, a stockholder may not maintain an action in his own
behalf for a wrong done by a third person to the corporation
on the theory that such wrong devalued his stock and the stock
of other shareholders.
[3) Id.- Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-An
action is derivative if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation or to the whole body of its stock or
property without any severance or distribution among individual holders, or if it seeks to recover assets for the corporation or to prevent dissipation of its assets.
[4] Judgments-Res Judicata-Persons Concluded.-A judgment
on the merits against a corporation on a wrong alleged to have
been done to it would ordinarily be res judicata in an action
by the stockholders on behalf of the corporation for the same
wrong, since the wrong was to the corporation as such and not
the stockholders individually.
[5] !d.-Sister State Judgments- Law Governing.-Whether a
Kevada judgment is a bar or res judicata as to another action
on the same cause in California is controlled by Kevada law.
(See Code Civ. Proc., ~ 1913.)
[1] See CaLJur.2d, Corporations, § 216 et seq.; Am.Jur., Corporations, § '161 et seq.
[5] See Cal.Jur., .Judgments, § 246; Am.Jur., .Judgments, § 530
et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [l-3] Corporations,§ 353; [4] Judgments,
§439; [3-7] Judgments, §476; [8] Evidence, §37; [9] Conflirt of
Laws, § 2; [10] Dismissal, § 2; [11-15, 29] Dismissal, § 20.1;
[16, 20] Judgments,§ 474; [17] Judgments, ~ 313; [18, 19] Judgments,~ 296; [21] .Judgments. ~ 478(1); [22] Corporations, § 635;
[23] Attorneys. §52; [24. 27] Attorneys, ~ 6:'5; [2,5] Attorneys,
§ 61; [26] Attorneys, § 64; [28] Corporations, § 693; [30] Judgments, § 449.
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Id.-Sister State Judgments-Law Governing. 'l'he effect of
a valid
or other interests of the parties
and persons in
them is determined
the law
of the state where
was rendered.
Id.-Sister State Judgments-Law Governing.-The effect of
a valid judgme.nt as a conclusive adjudication between the
and persons in
with them of facts which were
or might have been put in
in the proceedings is determined
the law of the state where the judgment was
rendered.
Evidence-Judicial Notice-Laws of Sister States.-.Judicial
notice is taken of the laws of the several states and the interpretation thereof by the
courts of appellate jurisdiction of such states. (Code
§ 1875.)
[9] Conflict of Laws-Law Governing Issues.- Where the issues
in a case are to be determined by the application of Nevada
law, but the Supreme Court of California ean find no Nevada
statute or case law covering the situation, the court will look
to the California law for a solution.
[10] Dismissal-Retraxit.-There is a distinction between a dismissal voluntarily made by the clerk's entry, which is presumed to be without prrjudice to the bringing of another
action, and a dismissal entered in open court pursuant to
stipulation, which is ordinarily effective as a retraxit, and in
the absence of such stipulation or motion addressed to the
court, there is no retraxit.
[11] !d.-Effect of Dismissal.-A dismissal with prejudice by
plaintiff of its action is a bar to a subsequent action on the
same cause; otherwise there would be no meaning to the
"with prejudice" feature.
[12] !d.-Effect of DismissaL-A dismissal with prejudice terminates the action and the rights of the parties are affected by
it; it is a final judgment in favor of defendants and they
are entitled to recover their costs.
[13] !d.-Effect of DismissaL-A mere statement that a judgment
of dismissal is "with prejudice" is not conclusive; it is the
nature of the action and the character of the judgment that
determines whether it is res judicata.
[14] !d.-Effect of DismissaL-A dismissal without prejudice is
not a bar to another action by plaintiff on the same cause,
but in other respects it has the effect of a final judgment in
defendant's favor since it terminates the action and concludes
the rights of the parties in that particular action.
[15] !d.-Effect of Dismissal.- -,\ n order of dismissal containing
[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 5.
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it
1s not a bar
action, unless the record shows that there was
an actual dc·terminatlon on the HH-:rits.
Judgments-Sister State Judgments-Full Faith and Credit.
-A ;judgment of a court of a sister state
be
full faith and credit. (U.S. Const., art. IV,§ 1.)
17b] !d.-Collateral Attack- Unauthorized Appearance by
Attorney.-A domestic judgment may not be impeached collatemlly on
that a regularly licensed attorney apan action had no authority to act on
[18] !d.-Collateral Attack-Presumptions.-On collateral attack
every
is in favor of the validity of the judgment
or order of a court of general jurisdiction, and any condition
of facts consistent with its validity and not affirmatively contradicted
the judgment roll will be presumed to have
existed.
[19] !d.-Collateral Attack-Presumptions.-On collateral attack
on a judgment it will be presumed, when necessary, that the
parties consented to the court's action or waived objection
thereto.
[20] Id.-Sister State Judgments-Full Faith and Credit.-The
full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution applies to the records and proceedings of courts only so far as
they have jurisdiction, and the courts of one state are not required to give full faith and credit to, or regard as valid or
conclusive, any judgment of a court of another state which
had no jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties
or, in proceedings in rem. of the res.
[21] Id.-Sister State Judgments-Want of Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack.--The jurisdiction of a court rendering a judgment is open to inquiry under proper averments when questioned in the courts of another state, and such rule applies in
the case of a
judgment entered on an attorney's unauthorized npJwnrance for a party.
[22] Corporations-Officers--Authority ..-'rrial court was justified
in
that a director and secretary of a corporation
had authority to commence an action by the corporation where
there wa~ evidence, although conflicting, that she held such
official position and that an attempt to remove her was abortive.
[23] Attorneys-Authority-Presumption.-The act of an attorney
in entering the appearance of a party carries with it a presumption of authority on his part to do so, nnd such presumption may k• weighed against evidence to the contrary
by the trier of fact.
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Id.-Authority-Scope-Dismissals.-An attorney
authorto dismiss his client's action without
Id.-Authority-Scope.-In civil
the client's
and in the absence
to bind his
in all matters
to the r<'gular conduct of a case, though such authority is subject to the
cation that an attorney
does not have
to do an act which will errect the surrender or loss
of a client's substantial
[26] !d.-Authority-Scope-Compromises.-An
is preaction
sumed to have authority to compromise his
which he is prosecuting.
[27] Id.-Authority-Scope-Dismissa.ls.-In view of the theory
that there is a rebuttable presumption that an attorney h11s
authority to surrender his client's rights, the trial court may be
justified in concluding that an attorney has authority to commence an action and to dismiss it with prejudice.
[28] Corporations-Officers-Liability.-Wllether directors of a
corporation acted collusively and fraudulently is a question
of fact, mere allegations to that effect not being proof.
[29] Dismissal-Effect of DismissaL-An attorney's testimony that
he did not think that the dismissal of a Nevada action, which
he commenced and dismissed with prejudice, would affect a
California action should not be allowed to alter the res judicata
effect of the Nevada judgment on collateral attack, since it
was only his opinion of the legal effect of the dismissal.
[30] Judgments-Res Judicata-Waiver and Estoppel.-Where the
defense of res judicata is raised, the mere fact that the court
confines the issue to res judicata does not foreclose plaintiffs
from making a showing that such defense has been waived
or that defendant is estopped from raising it, since this is a
part of the res jndicata issue.
APPEAl_~ from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed.

Action for damages for fraud and mismanagement. Judgment for defendants affirmed.
J. George Bragin and H. Ward Dawson, Jr., for Appellants.
Pearlson & Pearlson and Herbert Pearlson for Respondent.
CARTER, J .-Plaintiffs, alleging that they were stockholders of Nevada Desert Inn, a Nevada corporation, commenced the instant action asserting it to be on their behalf
and as representatives of the other stockholders. Among the
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defendants are the
a director and
o:ffice.r of Desert
other directors
the inn and also
Lela M. Anderson and Harold M. Morse. Burke was the only
defendant who answered the complaint. Presumably the
others had not been served.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant Burke had fraudulently
breached a contract with the inn under which he was to hold
property in trust for it and
funds to assist in the
financing of the construction of a hotel in I1as Vegas, Nevada,
and he was to take stock in the inn. They charged that he
fraudulently took inn funds; that the other directors knew
of Burke's actions and yet
did not
him; that the
directors mismanaged the affairs of the inn and misappropriated the funds thereof.
also
fraud on the
part of defendant Barkley in the salr of the stock to them,
and that l\iorse,
for some of the stockholders in an
action commenced in :\TeYada
the dirrctors, negligently
permitted the action to be lost on nonsuit.
Burke ans-wered and raisC>d the defense of res judicata by
reason of a judgment by a Nevada court of the eighth judicial
district. The judgment which the trial court herein found
to be res judieata came abont as follows:
In 1947 the inn commenced an action in the proper Nevada
court. The complaint filed therein was verified by Lela Anderson who stated therein that she was the secretary of the inn.
This action is hereafter called second NeYada action. The
complaint was signed
l\Iorse and Graves, a firm of Nevada
attorneys, by Harold M. Morse, as attorneys for plaintiff
therein. The action made substantially the same charges
against Burke as are made in the instant action. Burke
answerrd raising the general issue. A "Dismissal with Prejudice" signed by 1\Iorse and
by Harold M. Morse, as
attorneys for the inn was filed in that action on November 16,
1950 (the instant action was commenced on Apri! 11, 1949),
and based thereon the Nevada court on the same day made
its order that it appearing that plaintiff (the inn) having
filed its written dismissal of the action with prejudice and
on motion of Morse and
attorneys for plaintiff, the
action is '' dismjssed \vith
'' Prior to the above
m(mtioned Nevada action a similar action by the inn, with
.Morse as counsel, had been commenced and tried and resulted
in a nonsuit, hereafter referrC>d to as first NC>vada action.
Plaintiffs herr flrscribP their action as "derivative" and
insofar as they, as stockholders of the
are seeking redress

1
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it is such an action. [1] "A stocksuit has been called a 'derivative
action' for the reason that the wrong to be redressed is one
against the
the corporation would
bring the suit.
the corporation fails or
refuses to act after proper
the stockholder's ultimate
interest in the
is sufficient to justify the bringing
of a '
to set in motion the judicial
machinery for the redress of 1he wrong to the corporation.''
v.
Cour·1. 17 Cal.2d 13, 16 [108 P.2d
906. 135 A.hR. 318].) [2]
"Generally, a stockholder
may not maintain an action in his own behalf for a wrong
done by a third person to the eorporation on the theory that
such wrong devalued his stock a1Ll the stock of the other
shareholders. for such an action Y. ·mid authorize multitudinous litigation and ignore the corporate entity. Under
proper circumstances a stockholder may bring a representative
action or derivative action on behalf of the corporation.
[Citations.] [3] ' . . . The action is derivative, i. e., in the
corporate right, if the gravamen of the complaint is injury
to the corporation, or to the whole body of its stoek or property without any severance or distribution among individual
holders, or if it sreks to recover assrts for the corporation
or to prevent the dissipation of its assets.' "
(Sutter v.
General Petrolenm Corp., 28 Cal.2d 525, 530 [170 P.2d 898,
167 A.L.R 271].) [ 4] Being a derivative action, a judgment on the merits against the corporation on the wrong
alleged to have been done to it would ordinarily be res judicata
in an action by the stockholders on behalf of the corporation
for the same wrong. This follo·ws because the wrong was to
the corporation as such and not the stockholders individually,
henee a bar to an aetion by the corporation would be a bar
to an action by the stockholders for the corporation. (Scarbourongh v. Briggs, 81 Cal.App.2d 161 [183 P.2d 683]; see
Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co., 42 Cai.2d 11, 28 [265 P.2d 1] ;
Fletcher Cyc. Corps. (perm.ed.) § 5859; 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 794.)
Here we have a judgment (the Nevada judgment) of
dismissal with prejudice, rendered by the court on a motion
therefor by plaintiff. [5] Whether such a judgment is a
bar-res judicata-as to another action on the same cause
in this state is controlled by Nevada law. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 1913; Rall v. Lovell, 105 CaL\ pp.'2d 007 [233 P.2d
681]; Smith v. Smith, 115 Cal.App.2d 92 [251 P.2d 720];

; Goodrich on
Conflicts, § 450.)
The rule
'' ( 1) The effect of a valid judgor other interests of the parties and
persons in
with them is determined by the law of
the state where the
was rendered.
The effect of a valid
as a conclusive
between the
and persons in
with
them of
have been put in issue
in the proceedings is determined
the law of the state
where the judgment was rendered." (Rest., Conflicts, § 450.)
[8] Our courts take judicial notice of "the laws of the
several states of the United Statrs and the interpretation
therrof by the highest courts of appPllate jurisdiction of such
states." (CodP Civ. Proc., § 1875.) In Nevada the statute
with reference to dismissal, at tlw time the dismissal here
was made, provided that an action may be dismissed by
plaintiff at any time before trial if no affirmative relief is
sought by defendant; by either party with the consent of
the other; by the court when plaintiff fails to appear at
the trial; by the court when upon trial plaintiff ''abandons''
it; on nonsuit; and in ''every other ease judgment shall be
rendered on the merits." (Nev. Compiled Laws ( 1929),
§ 8793, as amended in 1939, Nev. Stats. 1939, p. 33.) * It
has been held by the Supreme Court of Nevada that where
there is a dismissal of the action at plaintiff's behest but
nothing is said about prejudice that the judgment is not
on the merits and hence not a bar to a subsequent action by
plaintiff on the same cause (Van Vliet v. Olin, 1 Nev. 495;
James v. Leport, 19 Nev. 174 [8 P. 47); Christensen v. Duborg,
38 Nev. 404 [150 P. 306] ), but where it is dismissed on the
stipulation of the parties it is on the merits and a bar. (Phillpotts v. Blasdel, 10 Nev. 19.) [9] We find no Nevada
statute or case law covering the case we have here where
the plaintiff moved the court for judgment of dismissal with
prejudice and the judgment of dismissal was with prejudice.
Under those circumstances we will assume the Nevada law
is not out of harmony with ours and thus we look to our law
for a solution of the problem. (See Str·md v. B1trgess, 144
Me. 263 [68 A.2d 241, 12 A.L.R2d 939); Knox v. Pryor, 10
Cal.App.2d 76 [51 P.2d 106]; 1vlcDonald v. Hartford Tntst
Co., 104 Conn. 169 [132 A. 902] ; Dimon v. Dimon, concurring
*Compare Code of Civil Pxocedure, sections 581, 58lb, 582, which are
sirn.ilar.

we said: "'l'hcre is a well-recognized distinction bet1veen a
dismissal voluntarily made by the clerl,'s entry, which is
to be without prejudice to the
of another
and a dismissal entered in open court pursuant to
which is ordinarily effective as a retraxit. In
the absence of such stipulation or motion addrrssed to the
conrt, there is no Telraxit." Here,
to the recital
in the Nevada jndgmcnt, the dismissal with
was
made witl1 prejudice on the motion of the inn's attorneys.
[11] It would seem clear that a dismissal with
plaintiff of its action is a bar to a
action on
the same cause; otherwise there would be no meaning to the
''with prejudice'' feature. [12] ''A dismissal with prejndice terminates the action and the rights of the
are
affected by it. It is a final judgment in favor of defendants
and they are entitled to recover their costs. [13] Bnt a
mere statement that a judgment of dismissal is 'with prejudice' is not conclusive. It is the nature of the action and
the character of the judgment that determines whether it
is res judicata. The intention of the court to make a determination on the merits may be important, but if the judgment is clearly not on the merits, the court's intention is
immaterial.
[14] "A dismissal without prejudice, on the other hand,
is not a bar to another action by the plaintiff on the same
cause. In other respects, however, it has the effect of a final
judgment in favor of the defendant, for it terminates the
action and concludes the rights of the parties in that particular
action . . . .
[15] "An order of dismissal containing no statement
whatever that it is made without prejudice is not a bar to
a subsequent action, unless the record shows that there was
an actual determination on the merits." (16 Cal.J ur.2d,
Dismissal, etc., § 5.) Finally, it is clear that any attack
on the Nevada judgment raised by Burke as a defense
in the instant action is collateral. (Kaufman v. Cal1:[Mnia
Min. & Dredging Syn(Zieate, 16 Cal.2d 90 [104 P.2d 1038] ;
Rest., Judgments, § 11, com. a.) [16] And, of course, a
judgment of a court of a sister state having jurisdiction
must be given full faith and credit. (U.S. Const., art. IV,§ 1.)
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the Nevada court lacked
jurisdiction, and its judgment is not a bar because Attorney
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inn's action with
Morse had no
prejudice, Anderson had no
to commence or prose·
cute the action for the
and the disHtissal was the result
of collusion and fraud
the
directors of the
inn and Morse.
Aside from the
of the tWope of the anthority of
an attorney with
power to repri1S<'llt a client in an
action, to dismiss his client's action (here the dismissal by
Morse of the inn's
, being raised
a direct attack
on the
there is the
of whether such question can be raised on a co11ateral attack on the judgment.
[17a] It has been stated both in this state and Nevada that
a domestic
may not be
collaterally on
the ground that a regularly licensed
appearing as
such for a party to au aetion had no
to act on his
behalf. (See Deegan v. Deegan, 22 NeY. 185 [37 P. 360, 58
Am.St.Rep. 742] ; Barber v. Barber, 47 Nev. 377 [222 P. 284,
v. C1'ty of Oakland, 30
39 A.L.R 706], dictum;
Cal. 439; Nielsen v. Emerson, 119 Cal.App. 214 [6 P.2d 281];
Strand Imp. Co. v. Long Beach, 173 Cal. 765 [161 P. 975],
approving the Deegan and Carpentier cases; S11ydam v.
Pitcher, 4 Cal. 280; Holmes v. Rogers, 13 Cal. 191; May v.
Rosen, 91 Cal.App.2d 794 [205 P.2d 1118].) fn Hill v. City
Cab & Transfer Co., 79 Cal. 188 [21 P. 728], the same rule
was stated but a collateral attack was permitted because it
was admitted that the attorney had no authority. [18] This
is in line with the general rule that: ''On collateral attack
every presumption is in favor of the validity of the judgment
or order of a court of general jurisdidion, and any condition
of facts consistent with its validity and not affirmatively
contradictrd by the judgment roll will be presumed to have
existed . . . .
[19] "Under this general rule it will be presumed, when
necessary, that the parties consented to the court's action
or waived objection thereto." (Phelan v. Superior Court,
35 Cal.2d 363, 373 [217 P.2d 951].) [17b] It is said in 88
A.L.R. 12, 36: ''There is a lack of agreement among the courts
on the question \Yhether or not a judgment can be attacked in
a collateral proceeding on the grounds that the defendant
was not served with process and that the attorney enterinl!
his appearance had no authority to do so. The weight of
authority supports the view that a domestic judgment, valid
on its faee, is not subjeet to collateral attack on this ground.''
(Citing cases from the federal eourts and Arkansas, Indiana,
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Iowa, J,ouisiana, Maine, Michigan,
New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 'l'exas
and \Vest Virginia; contra, Illinois, Kans2:s, Nebraska, Oregon
and Virginia. [See also 5 Am .•Jur ., Judgments, § 83].)
[20] On the other hand with respect to foreign judgments
(judgments of a sister state) it has been said: "Indeed, thr
clause of the Federal Constitutiou which requires full faith
and credit to be given in each state to the records and judicial
proceedings of every other state applies to the rt>cords and
proceedings of courts only so far as they have jurisdiction.
and the courts of one state are not required to give full faith
and credit to, or regard as valid or conclusive, any judgment
of a court of another state, which had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter, or of the partirs, or, in proceedings in rem,
of the res. [21] Accordingly, the jurisdiction of a court
rendering a judgment is open to inquiry under proper averments, when questioned in the court of another state. The
party against whom the judgment is r0ndered is not forced
to go to the state of the rendition of the judgment for rrlief.
These rules have been applied in the case of a foreign .htdgment entered upon an attorney's una~dhorized appearance
for a party." (Emphasis added; 31 Am.Jur., Judgments,
§ 549. See Rest., Judgments, § 12, com. e; Carlton v. !Vhller,
114 Cal.App. 272 [299 P. 738]; 50 C.J.S., Judgm0nts,
§ 893e (6).)
The question of the res judicata effect of the Nevada .judgment of dismissal was raised by Burke's motion to dismiss
the instant action and that was the sole issue presented to the
court. The court in its order of dismissal r<>eited that the
Nevada judgment was res judicata No other findings were
made but the court in its remarks from the bench stated
that as late as April, 1946, directors for Desert Inn had been
elected including Lela Anderson; that a purported meeting
of stockholders in Los Angeles in Septemb<>r, 1946, in which
Anderson was removed, was a nullity as notice thereof was
not given; that there is no showing that the action leading
to the Nevada judgment of dismissal was not authorized by
Desert Inn, inasmuch as Morse and Anderson were directors
of it. Implicit in the dismissal of the California action, on
the ground. of res judicata of the judgment in the Nevada
action, is the finding that Anderson had authority to commence th0 N<>vada action for the inn and Mor,;e had authority
to act as its attorney and dismiss the Nevada action with
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and that there was no fraud or collusion in the
commencement or dismissal of the Nevada action.
At the hearing on the res judicata question the transcript
of the trial in the first Nevada action which resulted in a
nonsuit was introduced as was a transcript of the record in
the second Nevada action. Morse's deposition was also received. Therein he testified that he was a regularly licensed
attorney practicing in Nevada; that he was one of the attorneys for the inn in the first Nevada action, being employed
Barkley and Anderson ; that after the nonsuit was granted
and in September, 1946, he wrote to Barkley stating he
desired to withdraw as attorney in the first action and that
he should obtain new counsel to file a new action; that after
he wrote the letter any and all association with Barkley or
plaintiff Gagnon was terminated; that he filed the second
action at the request of Lela Anderson and her husband; that
at the time of dismissal of that action he knew the California
action was pending as did counsel for Burke. He filed an
affidavit in the second action in reply to Burke's motion to
dismiss for failure to bring it to trial. stating that there
should not be a dismissal because the California action involving the same issues had been commenced and if it were not
tried the second action should be dismissed. He stated that
his dismissal of the second Nevada action was to have no
relation ''whatsoever'' to the California action, no bearing
on the issues in the California action, the one now before us.
Burke was called as a witness. It was stipulated he signed
the verified answer in the second Nevada action in which it
was alleged that Anderson had no authority to bring it for
the inn but Burke said he did not know whether or not she
had such authority. He testified that he and his counsel,
Mr. Pearlsen, went to Morse's office in November, 1950, to
have Morse dismiss the second Nevada action. He testified
that he and his counsel knew the California action had been
commenced; that they talked with Morse about settling the
second Nevada action and paid him some money ($1,500 or
$1,700) in settlement thereof and Morse had the action dismissed with prejudice as above mentioned. What Morse did
with the money does not appear.
Mrs. Anderson testified that she signed the verification of
the complaint in the second Nevada action in which she
stated she was secretary of the inn, although she thought she
was not at the time because of the purport eel stockholrlers'
meeting which purported to remove her, but Morse told her
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and she took his advice; that she
purported stockholders' meeting.
Plaintiff Gagnon testified concerning the stockholders'
in Los Angeles and that he vYas there elected president of the inn; that neither he nor any of the other stockholders of the inn ever authorized or knew about the commencement or dismissal of the second Nevada action and it
was ~tipulated they did not know Morse filed that action.
[22] Insofar as Anderson's authority is concerned, it
would appear that the court was justifird in coneluding she
was a director and secretary of the inn and the attempt to
remove her was abortive. There may be a conflict in the
evidence on thi1< issue but there is sufficient to support the
conclusion of the trial court. Hence she would not lack
authority to commence the second Nevada action by reason
of her holding no official position with the corporation.
[23] As to Morse's authority to commence the secoml
Nevada action there is a presumption that he had such
authority. '' 'The act of the attorney in entering the appearance of a defendant carries with it a presumption of due
authority upon his part to do so.' "
( Voinich v. Rollerz,
203 Cal. 379, 382 f264 P. 240], quoting from Garrison v.
McGowan, 48 Cal. 592, 600; see also Dale v. City Cmrrt of
Merced, 105 Cal.App.2d 602 [234 P.2d 110]; People v. Western Meat Co., 13 Cal.App. 539 [110 P. 338] ; Estate of Pailhe,
114 Cal.App.2d 658 [251 P.2d 76]; Wilson v. Ba1·ry, 102
Cal.App.2d 778 [228 P.2d 331] ; Sullivan v Dunne, 198 Cal.
183 r244 P. 343]; 6 Cal.Jnr.2d, Attorneys at Law,§§ 154-155.)
And that presumption may be weighed against evidence
to the contrary by the trier of fact. (Dale v. City Co11rt of
1lierced, supr·a, 105 Cal.App.2d 602.) The question should
be decided by the trial court. ( S1lllivan v. Dunne, supra,
198 Cal. 183.)
[24] With reference to an attorney's authority to dismiss
his client's action with prejudice it is said: ''An important
problem is related to the distinction between voluntary dismissals or nonsuits which are without prejudice to the cause
of action, and dismissals or nonsuits with prejudice, the last
mentioned type being referred to in the cases by the commonlaw term 'retraxit.' It is clearly within the attorney's
authority to dismis1< the client's action without prejudice.
However, a series of early cases held the general authority
of an attorney even sufficient to empower him to effect a
retraxit, amounting to a renunciation of the client's snb-
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stantive
or cause of action. It is hardly possible to
reconcile this rule with the established principle that the
implied
of an attorney does not include
any power or authority to dispose of the client's substantive
rights, and it would therefore seem doubtful whether, or to
what extent, the
cases would now be followed." ( 6 Cal.
§ 164.) [25] And further in
.Tur.2d, Attorneys at
that connection: ''In civil litigation, the attorney, as the
client's agent, and in the absence of fraud, has authority to
bind his dient in all matters pertaining to the regular conduct
of a case. . . . ln the absence of such special instructions,
the conduct and management of the action is entrusted to
the attorney's judgment; he decides what should be contested,
what points should be taken, and what should be abandoned.
This authority is, however, subject to the qualification that an
attorney ordinarily does not have implied authority to do
an act which will effect the surrender or loss of a client's
substantial rights, for the client determines 'the objectives
to be attended.'" (6 CaLJnr.2d, Attorneys at I,aw, § 156.)
[26] There is, however, a presumption that he has authority
to compromise his client's action which he is prosecuting.
(Chu.rch v. Chur·ch. 40 Cal.App.2d 701 [105 P.2d 643]; Burns
v.lllcCain, 107 Cal.App. 291 [290 P. 62:i]; 66 A.L.R. 107, 126;
~10 A.I,.R.2d 944, 953; Stale of l'•7evada v. Cal1:[ornia Llhn. Co.,
15 Nev. 234; Deegan v. Deegan, 22 Nev. 185 [37 P. 360, 58
Am.St.Rep. 742].) Defendant Burke points out that there
are authorities iu California and Nevada which bold that
on collateral attack the presumption of the attorney's authority is conclusive (Westwood Temple v. Enwnnel Center, 98
Cal.App.2d 755 [221 P.2d 146]; Parks~de Realty Co. v. MacDonald, 167 Cal. 842 [139 P. 805]; May v. Rosen, 91 CaL
App.2d 794 [205 P.2d 1118] ; Deegan v. Deegan, supra, 22
Nev. 185 [37 P. 860, 58 Am.St.Rep. 742] ), and it has been
held that an attorney has authority to dismiss an action with
prcj udice (the modern name for retraxit, Ghiringhelli v.
Ribom, 95 Cal.App.2d 503 [213 P.2d 17]; Robinson v. Hiles,
119 Cal.App.2d 666 [260 P.2d 194]) contrary to the rule at
common law. (Lam.b v. Herndon, 97 Cal.App. 193 [275 P.
503]; Bogardus v. O'Dea, 105 Cal.App. 189 [287 P. 149];
Chase v. Van Carnp Sea Food Co., 109 Cal.App. 38 [292
P. 179]; but see 6 CaLJur.2d, Attorneys at };aw, § 164, supra.)
·while the above cited cases may appear to conflict with the
rule that ori1inarily an attorney has no anthority to surrender
his client's rights
quotation supra, from 6 Cal.J ur.2d,
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at Law,
164),
may be reconciled on
the theory that there is a rebuttable presumption that he
had such authority.
[27] It would seem, therefore, that the trial court was
justified in concluding that l\Iorse had authority to commence
the second Nevada action and to dismiss it with prejudice.
[28] While there may be evidence from which it could be
inferred that Morse and Anderson and Burke's counsel and
Burke acted collusively and franclnlPntly, the question was
for the trial court. Plaintiffs rely in part on the allegations
in their complaint in the instant action that Morse, Burke,
Anderson and other directors acted collusively and fraudulently, but allegations are not proof. [29] It would seem
that Morse's testimony that he cli(1 not think the dismissal
of the second Nevada action woulcl affect the California action
should not be allowed to altrr the res judicata effect on
collateral attack. In effect it wa;s only his opinion of the
legal effect of the dismissaL
[30] Plaintiffs argue that Burke waived the defense of
res judicata and is estopped to assert it, and in that connection, that they ~vere prevented from giving evidf~nee on that
issue because the court confined the issue to res judicata.
It is doubtful that there was any eonduct on which a plea
of estoppel or waiver could be based as there was no change
in position on plaintifFs' part in reliance on Burke's claim in
the second Nevada action that Anderson ha(l no authorit:v
to act for the corporation. In any event the question would
appear to be one for the trial court. Confining the issue
to res judicata, as was done by the trial court, did not foreclose plaintiffs from making a showing that the defPnse bad
been waived or that Burke was estopped from raising it,
as that would be part of the res judicata issue.
Plaintiffs c•laim that the case is an unusual one in
which the doctrine of res judicata should not be applied (see
Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Ca1.2d 23 [194 P.2d 1] ; Guardianship
of Di Carlo, 3 Ca1.2d 225 [44 P.2d 562. 99 A.hR. 990]).
This ease does not present the factors present in those casrs
unless we hold that a dismissal with prejndice of an action
by a corporation to recover for a wrong alleged to have been
committed as to it cannot be res judicata where the dismissal
occurs after stockholders have commenced a derivative action
for the same wrong. No authority so holding has been cited
and we find none.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court was "motivated" in
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its order of dismissal by its finding that the prayer
of the complaint was not sufficient. Even if we delve into the
reasoning of the trial court it is clear it based its order on
the premise of res judicata.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J ., Edmonds, J., Traynor,
J ., and Spence, J ., concurred.
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MORTON .B'HEEDLAND et al., Respondents, v.
DOMENICK R. GRECO, Appellant.
[1] Trust Deeds-Sale Under Power-Deficiency Judgment.-If
there is only one note, secured by a chattel mortgage on equipment sold and a trust deed on realty owned by the purchaser.
which represents the purchaser's debt to the sellers, the sellers,
on the trustee's sale of the realty under power of sale, would
not be entitled to a deficiency judgment under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 580d, since the note is "secured by a deed of trust upon real
property" on which there could not be a judgment for "any"
deficiency.
[2] !d.-Sale Under Power-Deficiency Judgment.-Code Civ.
Proc., § 580d, declaring that there shall be no deficiency
,iudgment on a note secured by a trust deed or mortgage on
realty in any case in which realty has been sold by the
mortgagee or trustee under power of sale, does not require
that the note be secured solely by a trust deed; hence if the
note is secured by a trust deed on realty the code section
applies though it may also be secured by other security.
[3] !d.-Sale Under Power·-Deficiency Judgment.-Code Civ.
Proc., § 580d, precluding deilciency judgments following sales
of realty nnder power of sale in a trust deed, does not preclude
the creditor from foreclosing on any additional security, such
as a chattel mortgage, but the pursuit of additional security
is not a deficiency judgment, and the right to exhauc;t such
security gives no right to such a judgment. (Disapproving a

[1] See Cal.Jur., Trust Deeds, § 86 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trust Deeds,
s857 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-6] Trust Deeds, § 95(2); [7] Stntntes,
§ 124; [8] Statutes,~ 114; [9] Statutes,§ 166; [10] Statutes,§ lliO;
[11] Contracts, § 148.

